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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CANADA’S 
NEW COMPETITION POLICY
Bruce D. Hatfield*
The purpose of this paper is to identify and analyze the major 
constitutional issues raised by the recent legislative initiatives of the 
Federal government designed to implement a new competition 
policy for Canada. The first phase of those initiatives was incor­
porated in major amendments 1 to the Combines Investigation 
A c t2 which came into force in 1976. The second phase was laid 
before Parliament, just as this paper was being written, on March 
15, 1977, in the form of Bill C-42.3 Hereinafter these two pieces of 
legislation will be referred to as the Act and the Bill respectively.
Brief Overview o f  the Legislation
The major elements of Canada’s competition policy have 
traditionally been contained in the Combines Investigation Act. The 
previous focus of that policy is presently incorporated in Part V of 
the Act which sets out a series of offences in relation to business 
competition in Canada ranging from conspiracies to restrain 
competition to misleading advertising and provides the sanctions 
against them. Part IV provides further special remedies against 
those offences. The administrative arm of the statute is established 
and empowered by Parts I - III and Part VI ensures the enforce­
ability of its processes and orders. The 1975 amendments made a 
marked innovation with the addition of Part IV.l. This part defines 
a series of trade practices which are not absolutely prohibited but 
which are made reviewable and subject to orders. Aside from this 
addition, the 1975 amendments and those proposed in the new Bill 
have maintained this basic structure in the Legislation. The changes 
they made or propose to make in the substance of the legislation 
which are constitutionally significant will be discussed below.
Present Constitutional Status o f  Federal Competition Legislation
Since the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Proprietary 
Articles Trade Association v. A.-G. Canada4 in 1931, the accepted
* The author is a 3rd year student at U.N.B. Law School.
1 S.C. 1974-75, c. 76.
2 R.S.C. 1970, c. D-23, as previously amended by R.S.C. 1970 c. 10 (1st Supp.) s. 34 
and R.S.C. 1970 c. 10 (2nd Supp.) s. 65.
3 Second Session, Thirtieth Parliament, 25-26 Elizabeth II, 1976-77.
4 (1931) A.C. 310.
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constitutional basis for Federal legislation in this field has been the 
¡Dominion jurisdiction over criminal law and procedure granted by s. 
91(27) of the British North America A c t.5 An earlier attempt by the 
Federal government to deal with these matters through a regulatory 
framework had been pronounced ultra vires by Viscount H aldane,6 
but in the P.A.T.A.7 case Lord Atkin recognized that there was 
scope for the proper exercise of the criminal law power in this area. 
The Privy Council found that the purpose and effect of the 
Combines Investigation Act of that time was to denominate a series 
of crimes - such as combines and conspiracies to unduly lessen 
competition 8 - and to provide the machinery and the procedure 
necessary for the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of 
those crimes. Subsequent amendments and additions to the law in 
this area, whether by means of the Criminal Code or the Combines 
Investigation Act, which have been challenged constiutionally have 
been consistently upheld as being within Federal competence by 
virtue of the criminal law power. In 1937 the Privy Council approved 
an amendment to the Criminal Code outlawing price discrimina­
tion, 9 which proscription is now contained in s. 3410 of the Act. In 
1956, in the case of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. o f  Canada Ltd. v. 
The Queen, 11 the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a prohibition 
order against certain directors and officers of several companies 
convicted of conspiracy under s. 32(1) of the Act and thus gave 
approval to the constitutionality of that part of the present s. 30(1)12 
which provides for such orders. The Court said it was legislation 
going to the prevention of crime and as such it was within the grant 
of power under s. 91(27) of the Constitution. And in 1965, in the case 
of R. v. Campbell.13 the Ontario Court of Appeal turned back a 
challenge to the ban on the practice of resale price maintenance, 
now set out in s. 38 of the Act. The Supreme Court of Canada 
affirmed their decision that this was a legitimate exercise of the 
criminal law power.14
Since so many of the longstanding provisions of the Combines
5 1867, 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3, as am. (U.K.).
6 Re Board o f  Commerce Act. 1919 and the Combines and Fair Prices Act, 1919. 
[1922] 1 A.C. 191.
7 Supra, 4.
8 Now incorporated in s. 32(1) of the Act.
9 A.-C. British Columbia v. A.-G. Canada. [1937] A.C. 368.
10 s. 31 of the Bill proposes amendments to this section.
11 [1956] S.C.R. 303
12 See s. 21 of the Bill for proposed amendments.
13 58 D.L.R. (2d) 673.
14 46 D.L.R. (2d) 83.
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Investigation Act have found a firm constitutional basis in the 
criminal law power, it is probably natural and worthwhile to first 
consider whether the recent and proposed amendments can find a 
place to stand on that grant of power as well. Such an analysis 
requires a brief review of the jurisprudence on s. 91(27).
Scope o f  the Criminal Law Power
It has been suggested by many commentators 15 that courts over 
the years gave a very broad scope to this power to compensate for the 
rather narrow limits placed upon other areas of Federal jurisdiction 
such as the regulation of trade and commerce. Whatever the reason, 
it is true that very few constitutional restrictions have been placed 
upon its exercise.
The leeway the courts have been prepared to allow Parliament 
in employing this power was given perhaps its widest enunciation by 
Lord Atkin in the P.A.T.A .16 case. He refused to restrict the grant 
under s. 91(27) to the traditional domain of criminal jurisprudence, 
as Viscount Haldane had suggested in the Board o f  Commerce 1 
case, but instead pronounced: “Criminal law means the criminal law 
in its widest sense . . . .  The criminal quality of an act cannot be 
discerned by intention; nor can it be discerned by reference to any 
standard but one: Is the act prohibited with penal consequences?” 18
Subsequent decisions have limited that wide view somewhat 
through the doctrine of colourability. A Federal statute will not 
automatically be upheld as being within the criminal law power 
merely because in form it prohibits an act with penal consequences. 
If its real and primary purpose, in the perception of the court, was to 
use the criminal law form as a guise for concealing what was in 
substance a direct legislative intervention into areas reserved to 
provincial jurisdiction, then it would be struck down as a colourable 
use of that power. The existence of this limitation was acknowledged 
by Lord Atkin a few years after the P.A. T .A .19 case in his judgment 
in the Reference Re: s. 498 o f  the Criminal Code: “The only limita­
tion on the plenary power of Parliament to determine what shall or 
shall not be criminal is the condition that Parliament shall not, in 
the guise of enacting criminal legislation, in truth and in substance 
encroach on any of the classes of subjects enumerated in s. 92” 20
15 e.g. Peter W. Hogg & W arren Grover. "The Constitutionality of the Competition 
Bill" (1976), 1 Canadian Business Law Journal 197 at 207.
16 Supra, 4.
17 Supra. 6.
18 Supra. 4 at p. 324.
19 Supra. 4.
20 Supra. 9 at p. 315.
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However, it now seems settled that any evidence of any public 
detriment or public evil or public injury caused by the activity being 
proscribed will be sufficient to dispel any charge of colourability 
against what otherwise properly could be characterized as criminal 
law. The test of colourability was set out by Mr. Justice Rand in 
Reference re Validity o f  Section 5[a] o f  the Dairy Industry A ct: 21
A crime is an act which the law, with appropriate penal sanctions, forbids; 
but as prohibitions are not enacted in a vacuum, we can properly look for 
some evil or injurious or undesirable effect upon the public against which 
the law is directed.
The test was recently applied by Chief Justice Laskin in R. v. 
Morgentaler.22
When Viscount Simon, in an off-hand comment in A.-G. 
Ontario v. Canada Temperance Federation,n posited that “To 
legislate for prevention appears to be on the same basis as legislation 
for a cure” he perhaps unwittingly gave origin to another significant 
aspect of the criminal law power - the power to legislate for the 
prevention of crime. Normally, a court would feel free to disregard 
such judicial asides, even when sired by the Privy Council. In this 
instance, however, the Supreme Court of Canada transformed the 
proposition into a respectable doctrine of Canadian constitutional 
law and in the Goodyear24 case it was advanced to support the 
Court’s decision that prohibition orders enjoining certain future 
conduct by persons convicted under s. 32(1) of the A ct were a legiti­
mate incident of criminal law.
The guidelines the courts will use in characterizing legislation 
as going to the prevention of crime, and the degree of vigilance they 
will exercise in searching out improper constitutional puposes in 
Federal statutes relying on that doctrine, are far from clear. But one 
observation can be made. So far, to the writer’s knowledge, the 
courts have applied the doctrine only to justify a Federal interest in 
situations subsequent to and connected with an initial criminal con­
viction. As Ronald Cohen and Jacob Ziegel have pointed ou t,25 
when Chief Justice Laskin was discussing the Goodyear2b case in his 
judgment in MacDonald v. Vapor Canada L td .,2' he emphasized 
the necessary connection of the prohibiting order with a conviction
21 [1949] S.C.R. 1 at pp. 49-50.
22 [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616.
23 [1947] A.C. 193 at 207.
24 Supra. 11.
25 The Political and Constitutional Basis for a New Trade Practices Act, (Ottawa, 
1976) p. 45.
26 Supra. 11.
27 (1976), 22 C.P.R. 1.
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of a criminal offense. He described the case as illustrating “ the 
preventive side of the Federal criminal law power to make convic­
tions effective” . 28
With this background in the jurisprudence on s. 91(27) one is in 
a position to better appreciate the possibilities and the problems 
inherent in trying to fit the new competition legislation within the 
criminal law power.
The New Competition Policy as Criminal Law
While the Phase One amendments in the Act, and to an even 
greater degree the Phase Two proposals in the Bill, show a clear 
intention to give a more flexible and regulatory thrust to the govern­
ment’s competition policy, they also included a number of sections 
that look like, work like, and that undoubtedly were intended to be 
traditional criminal proscriptions. It seems almost certain that these 
new per se offences set out in Part V of the Act, such as bid 
rigging,29 pyramid selling,30 referral selling,31 secondary boycott 
practices,32 and misleading advertising,33 as well as those proposed 
by the Bill, such as being party to an illegal monopoly34 and 
systematic delivered pricing,35 would be upheld as valid as criminal 
law regardless of the constitutional judgment on other elements of 
the legislation. In all cases the particular act, however tortuously 
defined, is forthrightly and absolutely prohibited with penal 
consequences. Since the courts have long recognized a public 
interest in free and honest competition 36 it would be difficult to 
argue that the proscription is not aimed at an acknowledged public 
evil. Furthermore, there seems to be nothing that would distinguish, 
for constitutional purposes, these enactments from the prohibitions 
on price discrimination and resale price maintenance which, as 
noted above, have already been approved by the Privy Council and 
the Supreme Court.
Attempts to justify other sections of the legislation under the 
criminal law power would raise more serious objections. Two areas 
of particular concern are Part IV and Part IV. 1.
28 Ibid.. p. 13 (emphasis added).
29 S. 32.2 of the A ct.~
30 s. 36.3 of the Act.
31 s. 36.4 of the Act.
32 s. 38(6) of the Act.
33 s. 36 of the Act.
34 s. 31 of the Bill.
35 s. 33 of the Bill.
36 See Weidman v. Skragge (1912), 46 S.C.R. 1.
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Part IV. 1 of the A ct sets out a number of practices, including 
“ refusal to supply’’, 37 “consignment selling” , 38 and “ tied 
selling” , 39 which are usually considered to be inimicable to free 
competition but which occasionally can be justified as furthering or 
protecting legitimate economic interests. As a result, these practices 
are neither absolutely prohibited nor absolutely absolved by the Act; 
rather, they are made reviewable by a Restrictive Trade Practices 
Commission40 which will determine, in the particular circumstances 
of the case before it, whether the practice is reconcilable with the 
policy objectives of the legislation.41 The Bill continues the shift to a 
more flexible approach by expanding the number of reviewable 
practices to include such things as interlocking managements and 
price differentiation and by transferring some traditionally 
prohibited acts, such as mergers and some monopolies, into the 
merely reviewable category.42 Extensive guidelines are laid down to 
assist the Commission in making its review and if an order does issue 
to stop or modify the practice it is backed up by severe sanctions 
against a refusal to obey.43
Given even the broad scope historically allowed to Parliament 
under s. 91(27), it is very difficult to characterize what is being done 
through Part IV. 1 as the denomination of a crime. A similar scheme 
was disapproved as criminal law in the Board o f  Commerce44 case, 
although admittedly on a rather narrow view of that head of power. 
Even the very general definition laid down in the P.A.T.A . 45 case is 
not satisfied, however, because no particular act or practice is 
absolutely prohibited with penal consequences. Rather, a certain 
practice is defined which, if found to exist, gives the Commission the 
discretion to issue an order. If certain facts can be proved there is 
not, ipso facto, a violation of the law, but only the creation of juris­
diction within the Commission to choose to designate this practice as 
one against which an order may issue. That type of discretionary 
power in an administrative body is clearly a species of regulation and 
not of criminal law and procedure as those concepts are understood 
in Canada. The fact that failure to obey one of the Commission’s
37 s. 31.2 of the Act.
38 s. 31.3 of the Act.
39 s. 31.4 of the Act.
40 In s. 3 of the BUI the name of this body is changed to the Competition Board.
41 These objectives are set out in a preamble to be added to the Act by s. 1 of the Bill.
42 These changes are all incorporated in s. 26 of the Bill.
43 See s. 46.1 of the Act, to be amended by s. 37 of the Bill.
44 Supra. 6.
45 Supra. 4.
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orders is an indictable offence is not, of course, equivalent to the 
sanctions Provincial boards and agencies can call upon to enforce 
their directions. In neither case does this indicate that the proper 
constitutional source for the substance of those orders lies in s. 
91(27).
It would be easier to argue that Part IV. 1 is valid criminal law 
as legislation going to the prevention of crime. Many of the Practices 
reviewable under that part are closely connected with activities 
absolutely prohibited under Part V. “Consignment selling” , which is 
reviewable under the A ct is recognized by economists, and busines­
ses, as a means of avoiding the ban on resale price maintenance 
while achieving essentially the same results. “Joint monopolization” , 
known to economists as conscious parallelism, which would be 
reviewable under the Bill, was often raised as a defence to charges of 
conspiracy in restraint of competition under the A ct. 46 And mergers 
and monopolies, also reviewable under the Bill, are difficult to 
distinguish from the “ illegal monopoly” which would still be 
completely proscribed. Yet, as already noted, there are indications 
that the prevention of crime aspect of the criminal law power can 
only be invoked in connection with a conviction for some established 
crime. Under this legislation, however, that connection is not 
required either explicitly or implicitly. It is clear that a business is 
subject to an order to cease a practice of, for example, tied selling 
under Part IV. 1 without ever having been convicted of one of the 
accepted crimes under Part V. Even if the prevention of crime aspect 
is not so limited to situations where a conviction has been obtained, 
it surely must be necessary to point to a recognized crime that is 
being prevented by the order. In many cases, however, an order to 
stop a practice such as tied selling will only prevent, and only be 
intended to prevent, further tied selling, which is nowhere establish­
ed as a per se offense.
That these objections can be made to an argument that Part
IV. 1 is a valid exercise of the criminal law power is not surprising. 
The studies and recommendations on which the legislation is based 
were themselves premised on the belief that criminal law was an 
inappropriate means for securing the economic goals of the new 
policy.47 It is fairly clear that Parliament adopted that premise and 
made no attempt, in either form or substance, to draft Part IV. 1 as
46 See e.g. R. v. Armco Canada Ltd. et al. (1975) 6 O.R. (2d) at 578 et seq.
47 See eg. Dynamic Change and Accountability in a Canadian Market Economy, 
Lawrence Skeoch and Bruce McDonald (Ottawa 1976).
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criminal law. The assumption seems to have been made that a new 
constitutional basis will be found for these initiatives.48
The special remedies incorporated under Part IV of the A ct4Q 
are another area of concern when the constitutionality of the legisla­
tion is examined under the head of the criminal law power. Aside 
from sections 28 and 29 (as they will be constituted under the Bill), 
these remedies are all related to activities that have been absolutely 
proscribed under Part V .50 As pointed out earlier, the fundamental 
question as to whether Parliament could employ civil law types of 
remedies in the exercise of its criminal law responsibilities has 
already been affirmatively answered in the Goodyear51 case, where 
the authority given under the present s. 30(1) to issue prohibition 
orders against persons convicted of offences under the Act was 
upheld. The Court in that case did leave open the question of 
whether the dissolution orders provided for under the same section 
would be justifiable.
Other remedies provided by this Part, and still open to 
challenge, are: interim injunctions pending prosecutions under Part
V ,52 anticipatory prohibition and dissolution orders directed 
against conduct prohibited by Part V but available for issue 
independent of a prosecution or conviction,53 and the private right 
of action to recover damages suffered as a result of illegal activities 
under the Act.54
Because of the availability of such a wide variety of “penal 
consequences” against acts prohibited under Part V, a criminal 
prosecution can be used almost as effectively as a review and an 
order under Part IV. 1 to impose specifically tailored guidelines on
48 Perhaps it should be noted at this point that if Part IV. 1 was not upheld under any 
head of Federal power it would be severable. Following the standard test, it would 
be easy to demonstrate that Parliament would have passed the rest of the Act even 
if this part had not been included. It is not essential to the rest of the Act, nor is 
the rest of the Act to it. Its presence does not contaminate the remainder and its 
absence would not sterilize it.
49 To be amended by ss. 19-23 of the Bill.
50 s. 28, which provides for tariff adjustments to encourage competition probably has 
sufficient constitutional justification in the Dominion’s absolute control over tariff 
policy implicit in s. 91(2) of the B.N.A. Act. S. 29. which would allow the Competi­
tion Board to issue interim injunctions incidental to its review process will 
undoubtedly stand or fall with Part IV. 1 as a whole.
51 Supra. II.
52 s. 29.1, to be amended by s. 20 of the Bill.
53 s. 30(2) to be amended by s. 21 of the Bill.
54 s. 31.1. to be amended by s. 23 of the Bill. This much heralded means of enforcing 
this right provided by Part V.l of the Bill— the class of action — does not seem to 
raise any constitutional issues distinct from those already posed by s. 31.1 itself.
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the structure and practices of individual businesses. That realization 
might lead some to raise the spectre of colourability against sections 
29.1 and 30, arguing that the range and type of remedy connected 
with the particular crime demonstrates that the so-called crime is 
only a guise and the so-called punishment is the real, but improper 
purpose of the legislation. Yet once it is admitted that a series of 
crimes in the constitutional sense have been created in Part V, it 
becomes extremely difficult to challenge the sanctions provided 
against them. The natural extension of a broadly based criminal law 
power capable of supporting a wide variety of crimes is an equally 
broad power to attach a variety of types of punishment. This exten­
sion was recognized by Mr. Justice Rand in the Goodyear55 case 
where he said “The evolving and transforming types and patterns of 
social and economic activities are constantly calling for new penal 
controls and limitations and that new modes of enforcement and 
punishment adapted to the changing conditions are not to be taken 
as being equally within the ambit of parliamentary power is, in my 
opinion, not seriously arguable.” 56
The provisions for dissolution orders on conviction of certain 
offences and for interim injunctions pending prosecutions seem 
particularly easy to defend in the light of this jurisprudence. 
Furthermore, in both cases there is a convenient analogy with a 
traditional incident of the criminal justice process. Specifically, a 
dissolution order certainly resembles a sort of capital punishment 
for corporate offenders, while interim injunctions are at least similar 
to the arrest and detention before trial of individuals charged with 
criminal offences and the undertakings on which their interim 
release is often conditional.
The anticipatory injunction and dissolution orders under s. 
30(2) of the Act pose more of a problem since their issue is not 
dependent on a criminal conviction nor are they merely temporary 
measures incidental to a criminal prosecution. Thus the principles 
and analogies relied upon above are not available for support. How­
ever, a better argument can be made here on the basis of the preven­
tion of crime doctrine than was available for orders under Part IV. 1. 
Although there is still no necessary connection between these orders 
and any conviction or prosecution, at least in this case, they may only 
issue against conduct that clearly constitutes a criminal offence. For 
this reason, a constitutional challenge to an order under s. 31(2) 
might be the best means of forcing the courts to give more precision 
to the “ prevention of crime” doctrine by identifying more exactly 
which elements are necessary for its application.
55 Supra. 11.
56 Ibid., p. 311.
}
If s. 30(2) was a bold constitutional step, s. 31.1 was even bold­
er. The intent is clearly to provide a private complement to the 
public enforcement of the criminal proscriptions under Part V and 
to help to ensure that any profit incurred from illegal activities is 
returned to those from whom it was taken. That intent is implement­
ed by conferring on private persons the right to take private legal 
actions to recover damages they suffered as a result of conduct 
contrary to Part V, even if the defendant has not been convicted of, 
or even charged with, a violation. The effect is to incorporate the 
whole of Part V holas bolus into the field of actionable wrongs in 
civil law.
There has been a longstanding judicial debate, carried out by 
way of dicta as to where the authority over the civil consequences of a 
criminal action lay.57 The recent decision of Chief Justice Laskin in 
the Vapor Canada58 case seems to offer more substantial guidance. 
In that judgment he found that a provision in a Federal statute 
proscribing certain trade practices, coupled with a general provision 
in the Criminal Code setting out a standard sanction for the 
violation of any Federal act, did not provide a sufficient basis for the 
vesting of a civil remedy in anyone who suffered damage as a result 
of those practices. The situation under consideration is distinguish­
able in that the criminal proscription and the civil remedy are both 
set out in the same statute and the link between them is much more 
direct. However, it is still possible for that remedy to be enforced in 
“ a situation unrelated to any criminal proceeding” 1 because a 
prior conviction or prosecution is not necessary.
Accepting even Rand’s generous view of Federal power to 
improvise punishments to fit violations of otherwise legitimate 
criminal statutes, it does seem to be a significant and perhaps fatal 
step to go from taking away the rights and property of persons 
convicted of crimes through public prosecutions, with all the protec­
tions for the accused inherent in that process, to vesting in private 
persons the right to use the same law as the basis for a private action 
where the same procedural safeguards would not be available. This 
looks very much like a Federal intrusion into a Provincial field, 
property and civil rights, whose borders have always been jealously 
guarded by the courts.
There are, of course, various constitutional doctrines - double 
aspect, trenching, ancillary - that are sometimes used to justify
12 U.N.B. LA W JOURNAL
57 See Trans/x>rt Oil Ltd. v. Imperial Oil Ltd. et al. (1935) O.R. 215 at 219 per 
Middleton, J.S. (Ont. C.A.). Direct Lumber Co. Ltd. v. Western Plywood Co. Ltd.. 
|1% 2| S.C.R. 646 at pp. 649-50 per Judson, J. and Ross v. Registrar o f  M otor 
Vehicles. 11975] 1 S.C.R. 5 per Pigeon, J.
58 Supra. 27.
59 Ibid.. p. 13.
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Federal intervention into normally Provincial areas. But does the 
direct creation of a civil right of action in a person merely “ affect” 
property and civil rights in a province? Is s. 31.1 really necessarily 
incidental to the prohibitions and procedures set out in the A ct? 
With the large fines, jail terms, and injunctions now arising from 
violations of Part V, is s. 31.1 really necessary to establish an effec­
tive level of sanctions? If the real aim of Part V is to protect the 
public interest in free and honest competition, is it really necessarily 
incidental to the scheme that private persons should be able to 
recover their particular damages? Can s. 31.1 truly be seen as going 
to the prevention of crime when the vesting of the right is not depen­
dent on a conviction and the offender could easily settle with the 
complaining person while continuing the illegal activity? All of these 
questions reflect serious, although perhaps not insurmountable, 
hurdles to the establishment of the constitutionality of s. 31.1, at 
least under the criminal law power.
Other Bases o f  Jurisdiction
As indicated earlier, the real focus of the Federal competition 
policy is now found in Part IV. 1 of the Act. It is a much more flexible 
and refined approach, concerned with the individual economic 
causes and effects of particular business structures and practices 
rather then with absolute principles of law. It is designed for 
economists and statisticians, not lawyers and prosecutors. As was 
also indicated above, there is considerable doubt whether it is 
possible, or indeed desirable, to attempt to justify this approach on 
the traditional constitutional basis for Federal initiatives in this 
area, the criminal law power. Thus a search has been underway for 
some time for a different constitutional head of power that would be 
more accommodating to the whole of the competition policy that has 
been proposed. Two solutions are usually advanced, either the 
general, “ peace order and good government” power or the power 
over “ the regulation of trade and commerce”.
The New Competition Policy and the General Power
Most advocates of the position that the legislation 
implementing the new competition policy can be constitutionally 
supported as an exercise of the general power of Parliament to make 
laws for the peace, order and good government of Canada have 
proceeded on the basis of the “national dimensions” doctrine. That 
doctrine sprang from the words of Lord Watson in the Local 
Prohibition 60 case as he attempted to explain how matters normally
60 A.-G. Ontario v. A.-G. Canada. (18%) A.C. 348 at 361.
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within provincial competence might become susceptible to Federal 
legislative control under the general power in certain circumstances:
Their Lordships do not doubt that some matters, in their origin local and 
provincial, might attain such dimensions as to affect the body politic of the 
Dominion, and to justify the Canadian Parliament in passing laws for their 
regulation or abolition in the interest of the Dominion.
As a constitutional justification for Federal legislation in several 
fields, these words were often cited in argument but seldom followed 
in judgments during the supremacy of the Privy Council. Through 
the 1950’s and 1960’s, however, it became quite fashionable for the 
Supreme Court to rely on those words when upholding Federal 
legislation on the basis of the general power. As a result, those 
constitutional scholars who favoured a shift of legislative power to 
the centre became quite enamoured with the prospects of an unre­
stricted use of this doctrine. For almost every problem that was 
identified in the nation, including the problems provoking a new 
competition policy, they were quick to point out the national 
dimensions of the problem, the fact that its incidence in one part of 
the country affected the other parts because of the interconnected­
ness of the Canadian economy and the mobility of Canadian society, 
and then concluded that the problem was susceptible to rectification 
by Federal legislation on the basis of this doctrine. In some cases the 
reasoning went further to suggest that, since Parliament could legis­
late, it surely could legislate in the most effective and comprehensive 
manner even if that meant intrusion into traditional areas of provin­
cial responsibility.
These were the magnificent pretensions of the national dimen­
sions doctrine as it marched into the Anti-Inflation A ct Reference, 61 
the proud and confident champion of the Federal cause. Whether it 
survived that encounter it all is still not clear, but it is at least certain 
that it was badly bloodied. While the particular piece of legislation 
was upheld by a 7-2 vote, the majority of the Court’s members 
clearly and specifically rejected all suggestions that it was support­
able on the basis of a national dimensions doctrine and reaffirmed 
the more traditional limits of the general power. Those limits are 
that the general power has two, and only two aspects: a residual 
aspect for accommodating legitimate constitutional “matters” that 
could not be properly characterized as coming within any of the 
classes of subjects enumerated in s. 91 and s. 92, and an emergency 
aspect that supports Federal intervention in matters normally 
reserved to the Provinces in times of crisis.
Assuming there is no crisis of competition in the nation, one 
must still consider whether the competition policy expressed in the
61 (1976), 68 D.L.R. (3d) 453.
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legislation being examined is a constitutional matter that is appro­
priate for triggering the residual aspect of the general power. How 
can one test whether the subject of a piece of legislation is a matter 
that is residual under the constitution? To formulate a positive 
response to that question is perhaps the most difficult task that will 
face consitutional scholars in the next few years.62 Certainly to 
claim the status of a distinct constitutional matter, a subject must 
have such a degree of natural or at least historical unity that to 
remove or alter any of its elements would be to substantially change 
its character. Aeronautics and telecommunications are often cited as 
examples.
While the necessary elements of a proper classification formula 
are not yet clear, a majority in the Anti-Inflation Reference did agree 
that it was not sufficient to merely gather up a collection of subjects, 
each properly within an enumerated class under the Constitution, 
place a single label on the collection, and then claim that it 
constituted a distinct matter that could not be accommodated by an 
enumerated class and must therefore be a residual matter exclusive­
ly reserved to Parliament. “ Inflation” was not accepted as a 
constitutional matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament 
because to legislate with respect to inflation really meant to legislate 
with respect to monetary policy, taxation, labour relations, 
contracts, professions, government employees, etc. and each of these 
were already recognized, either by the constitution or jurisprudence 
as separate and distinct matters which had been alloted between the 
two levels of government.
It seems that a strong argument can be made that “competition 
policy” is such a collection with a convenient label rather than a 
distinct and residual matter with a natural and indivisible unity. 
Anti-competitive contracts, torts and crimes were actionable at law 
long before Confederation and were implicitly recognized as 
distinguishable constitutional matters when jurisdiction over civil 
and criminal law was separated in the B.N.A. Act. The importance 
of tariffs and patents in any overall competition policy was well 
understood in 1867 and yet, rather than being residual and linked, 
each was included in a separate enumerated head of power.63 The 
power to grant monopolies was a traditional royal prerogative that 
was subsumed in the Provincial jurisdiction over the incorporation 
of companies with provincial objects.64 Can it seriously be contend­
ed that our Constitution either explicitly or implicitly contemplates
62 See “ Unity and Diversity in Canadian Federalism: Ideals and Methods of Moder­
ation” , W.R. Lederman (1975), 53 C.B.R. 597.
63 S. 91(2) and 91(22) of the B.N.A. Act.
64 S. 92(11) of the B.N.A. Act.
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that “competition policy” should be a distinct and residual matter 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Parliament when the 
essential elements of such a policy, which were recognizable as such 
in 1867, were so deliberately portioned out between the two levels of 
jurisdiction? This may be seen by some as a defect in our Constitu­
tion in the same way that many people see s.93 of the B.N.A. A ct as a 
defect in that it precludes a national educational system. Those are 
political arguments for constitutional reform. As legal arguments 
they must fall before the plain meaning of and the established juris­
prudence on our Constitution.h5
The Last. Best Hope - The Regulation o f  Trade and Commerce
If it is accepted that the general power is of no assistance, the 
last hope of constitutional refuge for those parts of the new competi­
tion legislation which cannot stand as criminal law is s. 91(2) of the 
B.N.A. Act. It is natural that proponents of the legislation should 
look to this section for support. Most of the innovations in the 
competition law which are open to challenge are at least generally 
modeled after the processes of the American Federal Trade Com­
mission which have found their constitutional support in that section 
of the American Constitution granting to the Federal government 
the power “ to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among 
the several states and with Indian tribes” . Prima facie the grant of 
power under our s. 91(2) is much broader and there is little doubt 
that if it were read and applied literally and in isolation, Parlia­
ment’s authority to enact the whole of the new A ct and the new Bill 
would not be open to question.
But constitutions are more than just a collection of words and 
the process of constitutional adjudication is more than a grammati­
cal exercise. Constitutions are the codifications of bargains between 
particular peoples which attempt to accommodate their often 
conflicting histories and project their often conflicting hopes. They 
are interpreted not in the abstract, but in the course of events by 
men who have their own historical and political conceptions of the 
scope and purpose of those bargains. In that light it is not unusual 
that the same words in similar constitutions should entail different 
results. In that light, the expanded scope given to the Federal 
commerce power in the United States is not difficult to understand. 
But even in that light, the extent to which the Privy Council restrict­
ed the Trade and Commerce power in Canada has been impossible 
for many Canadian constitutional scholars to accept.
The litany of cases, beginning with Citizens Insurance Co. v. 
P a r s o n s that in their eyes eviscerated s. 91(2), is familiar. For the
65 See Hogg and Grover, supra. 15 for the other side of this argument.
66 (1881), 7 App. Cas. %.
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purpose of this paper only the result is important. And that result 
was a Trade and Commerce power that was capable only of exercis­
ing authority over foreign trade, interprovincial trade and the 
“general regulation of trade and commerce in Canada” . It did not 
include the power to regulate contracts or particular trade or 
businesses in a province and the jurisdiction over interprovincial 
trade did not extend to even the regulation of intraprovincial trans­
actions incidental to such trade. The “general regulation” seemed to 
encompass little more than the incorporation of Dominion 
companies.
After appeals to the Privy Council were abolished in 1949, 
Canadian courts began to revitalize the Trade and Commerce power 
to a certain extent. They have given a generous interpretation to the 
power over foreign and inter-provincial trade so as to allow the regu­
lation of particular trades in a province,6 and even intra-provincial 
transactions,68 as long as that regulation is necessarily incidental to 
a scheme of foreign or inter-provincial trade in various products 
such as wheat or oil. They have been almost as vigilant in protecting 
this Federal domain from Provincial interference as the Privy 
Council was against Federal encroachments on property and civil 
rights.b<) Although the Supreme Court has never strayed beyond the 
boundaries laid down in Parsons, 70 and although it has never 
claimed that Parliament could proceed into the direct regulation of 
intra-provincial transactions or contracts or businesses with no real 
connection to inter-provincial or foreign trade, it has indicated a 
willingness to seek out or at least recognize such a connection in 
cases where its significance might not be obvious to all observers.
The drafters of the new competition legislation could have 
taken direct advantage of this trend in the jurisprudence. In particu­
lar they could have set out in each section of Part IV. 1 that the 
practice was not to be reviewable unless it was having, or would 
have, a significant effect on inter-provincial or foreign trade and 
commerce. This would have limited the purview of the legislation to 
some extent, of course, but it would probably not be difficult to show 
such an effect in most of the practices presently dealt with in Part 
IV. 1. Meanwhile, the constitutionality of the legislation itself would 
be beyond reproach. However, as presently framed, Part IV. 1 seems 
to contemplate a Federal jurisdiction over contracts and business
67 M urphw . C.P.R. andA.-G . Can.. [1958] S.C.R. 626; Caloil Inc. v. A.-G. Canada. 
[1971] S.C.R. 543.
68 R. v. Klassen (1959). 20 D.L.R. (2d) 406 (Man. C.A.).
69 A.-G. Manitoba v. Manitoba Egg and Poultry Association (1971) S.C.R. 689.
70 Supra. 66.
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structures and business practices that are wholly intra-provincial, 
wholly local and private in nature, wholly to do with property and 
civil rights in the provinces. Simply stated, there is no precedent or 
authority for such a claim of jurisdiction by Parliament.
But while Parliament has presented a bold stand in Part IV. 1, it 
has also prepared what might be seen as a convenient escape route in 
s. 39 of the Bill which would add the following section to the Act:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the Board to make an
order in respect of any matter that is not within the legislative authority of
Parliament.
This provision would seem to insulate the powers granted to the 
Board in Part IV. 1 from constitutional challenge except by means of 
a reference. If one were to convince a court that no Federal agency 
could possess the constitutional authority to issue any particular 
order being complained of, that would only go to show, because of 
this section, that the Board had acted outside the jurisdiction 
granted to it by the Act and not that Parliament had acted outside 
the jurisdiction granted it by the Constitution. Such a judicial 
finding would, of course, effectively preclude the Board from issuing 
similar orders in the future. In this way the substance of Part IV. 1 is 
opened to an indirect and gradual constitutional refinement while 
being safely protected from any sudden or complete overturning 
through a direct constitutional attack. In the meantime, individual 
orders could be defended on the basis of any accepted head of 
Federal power, such as that over inter-provincial trade, again with­
out the necessity of defending the vires of the substance of Part IV. 1 
as a whole.
If the Federal authorities were forced to defend the substance of 
their legislation, and not just the others issued thereunder, it seems 
that two avenues would be left to it under the trade and commerce 
power.
The first would be to argue that the guidelines and processes 
under Part IV. 1 amount to a general regulation of trade in Canada 
as contemplated in the third aspect of the trade and commerce 
power set out in the Parsons71 case. Indeed, that is the claim made 
in the long title that would be added to the Act by s. 1 of the Bill. At 
present there is no precedent for such a broad application of that 
third aspect. The scope suggested for it by the Federal Court of 
Appeal in the Vapor Canada72 case would have been more than suf­
ficient to uphold these provisions but that judgment was of course 
overruled by the Supreme Court of C anada.73 In its decision, the
71 Supra, 66.
72 (1972), 33 D.L.R. (3d) 434.
73 Supra. 27.
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Court said that to codify existing economic torts in a Federal statute 
while leaving their enforcement to private civil actions did not 
amount to the “ general regulation of trade in Canada”. Chief Justice 
Laskin, who gave the Court’s judgment, was careful to distinguish 
and leave open the issue of the constitutionality of a general scheme 
of regulation operated by a Federal agency under the third aspect of 
91(2), so the decision is by no means fatal to Part IV. 1. Not to destroy 
that hope, but only to qualify it, it should be noted that in the subse­
quent Anti-Inflation Act Reference a majority of the Court was 
not prepared to find that a general scheme, administered by a 
Federal agency to regulate the prices and profits and collective 
agreements of businesses in Canada, was supportable under s. 91(2).
The second possible approach would be to ask the Court to over­
rule the longstanding dicta in the Parsons ’5 case, and thus inci­
dentally several leading decisions which have relied upon them, and 
move toward a more literal interpretation of the grant of power 
under 91(2). The aim would be to allow Parliament to directly and 
unabashedly regulate all trade and commerce, including that which 
is wholly intra-provincial and which has no effect at all on inter- 
provincial trade. To so decide would not be a case of the court 
pronouncing on a new constitutional issue, or clarifying an earlier 
decision whose proper interpretation was in doubt; rather it would 
be a conscious and substantial reversal of accepted constitutional 
doctrines which would carry with it a significant transfer to juris­
diction over legislative powers that have been employed for decades. 
It is not inconceivable that a court might take such a course. But 
given the current state of Federal-Provincial relations in the country. 
I frankly believe it would be an unlikely, because irresponsible, 
initiative.
Conclusions
The conclusions of this analysis can be briefly stated. It is my 
belief that a significant and severable portion of the new competition 
policy can be constitutionally justified on the basis of the criminal 
law power. However, those provisions which clearly reflect the new 
regulatory approach, particularly Part IV. 1 and certain of the 
special remedies under Part III, may require a different head of 
constitutional power to support them. The general power is unlikely 
to satisfy that need so the best remaining prospect is the power to 
regulate trade and commerce. It is my submission that the present 
jurisprudence on s. 91(2) is not capable of supporting the entire 
purported scope of the legislation. However, the “general regulation 
of trade” aspect of that power might well prove sufficiently 
malleable in the hands of the Supreme Court to accommodate it.
74 Supra. 61.
75 Supra. 66.
